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‘Science, mathematics, history, art, cooking and carpentry feature on the curriculum, not bingo, bridge and billiards. Presumably there must be some reason for this apart from their utilitarian or vocational value.’ (Ethics and Education p144). 

In Ethics and Education (1966), and again in ‘The Justification of Education’ (1973), Richard Peters set out to discover this reason. In the course of his enquiry, practical subjects like cooking and carpentry drop out of the picture, leaving him with ‘theoretical enquiries’, that is, forms of understanding concerned with the pursuit of truth, like science, history and literary studies. Over these same years, Peters also collaborated with Paul Hirst, whose ‘forms of knowledge’ theory of liberal education was published in 1965. This, too, sought to justify theoretical disciplines on intrinsic grounds. It was not surprising, therefore, that Hirst and Peters co-authored The Logic of Education in 1970, a book that took the Hirstian forms of knowledge as its basis for the curriculum. 

All this happened forty years ago. With the passing of time, this joint research project, which was then so influential, seems increasingly hard to make sense of. Why should anyone, not least philosophers, have thought that the way to decide what should be taught in schools is to start with academic disciplines and seek justifications of them? This is so obviously putting the cart before the horse. Logically, curriculum planning has to start with aims, not with vehicles whereby aims may be realised. 

Looking back, too, there seems to be more to be said than philosophers of education thought at the time for Michael Young’s 1971 comment that Hirst’s view





Certainly, if we go back to the quotation from Peters with which this essay began, it is hard not to read him as taking the traditional school curriculum as read and assuming that there must be good reasons for it.






I will come back to this point somewhat later. Meanwhile, there is another feature of the Peters-Hirst project that, in hindsight, looks hard to fathom. Utilitarian reasons for teaching science, mathematics or history are not hard to find. But the sort of reason which both authors favour is intrinsic. Why?

This may not seem to raise difficulties. Aren’t teachers justly delighted when a pupil develops a passion for doing science or for reading poetry, not out of any instrumental motive, but simply because the subject is intrinsically fascinating?

I’m sure this is right, but it’s rather beside the point. For what is patently true of Hirst’s theory, and only marginally less obviously true of Peters’ account in Ethics and Education, is that a pupil is expected to be intrinsically motivated not only, if at all, in a subject for which he or she has a passionate interest, but across the board, that is, in every mode of understanding. 

This demand for comprehensiveness is fully explicit in Hirst, for whom to have a rational mind is to have been initiated into all the seven forms. Insofar as Peters adopts Hirst’s position in co-authoring with him The Logic of Education, one may expect him to go along with this. But in any case, in his independent writings, Peters seems to be saying much the same thing. In ‘The Justification of Education’, for instance, he writes that the educated man ‘possesses a considerable body of knowledge together with understanding’. In Ethics and Education he says that a highly trained scientist is not an educated man unless he also possesses ‘cognitive perspective’. This involves ‘seeing [science’s] connection with much else, its place in a coherent pattern of life’ (p.31). Later in the same book, his celebrated ‘transcendental argument’ for curriculum activities brings him even closer to Hirst’s comprehensiveness. It states that

..in so far as [a man] can stand back from his life and ask the question ‘Why this rather than that?’ he must already have a serious concern for truth built into his consciousness. For how can a serious practical question be asked unless a man also wants to acquaint himself as well as he can of [sic] the situation out of which the question arises and of the facts of various kinds which provide the framework for possible answers? The various theoretical enquiries are explorations of these different facets of his experience. To ask the question ‘Why do this rather than that?’ seriously is therefore, however embryonically, to be committed to those inquiries which are defined by their serious concern with those aspects of reality which give context to the question which he is asking. In brief the justification of such activities is not purely instrumental because they are involved in asking the question ‘Why do this rather than that?’ as well as in answering it.  (p.164)

Both Hirst and Peters, therefore, favour initiation into a comprehensive range of theoretical enquiries pursued for intrinsic reasons. But what could legitimate this as an account of a desirable education? It would mean all students taking an intrinsic interest not only in, say, science, but also in philosophy, mathematics, history, literary studies  and religious studies. Psychologically, this is to ask a lot of them. One may well hope that all of them will find intrinsic delights in some pursuit or another; and no doubt there are occasional polymathically-inclined pupils who adore everything they learn. But it seems excessively rigorous to expect everyone to develop an intrinsic interest in every mode of understanding.

In the light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that whenever Hirst or Peters attempts a justification of their ‘instrinsic’ position, they never quite bring it off. The most celebrated justification is Peters’, quoted at length above. This is formally similar to Hirst’s justification of the pursuit of the seven forms of knowledge (K and C: 42). Both arguments fail to show, as they claim to do, that in asking for justification one is already committed to the intrinsic pursuit of a broad range of kinds of knowledge. It is true that in asking ‘Why do this rather than that? or (in Hirst’s case) ‘Why pursue knowledge?’, one wants to know the true, well-founded answer to one’s question. If you like to put it this way, the questioner is committed to the pursuit of knowledge on this very specific point. But this does not mean he or she is committed to the pursuit of science, philosophy, literature etc, as the Hirst-Peters position requires. (White 1973 ***). 

Peters’ later wrestlings with the same problem in ‘The Justification of Education’ likewise fail to clinch things. In Ray Elliott’s words, Peters here claims that 

the educational pursuit of truth in disciplines such as science, philosophy, literature and history is in certain fundamental respects the same as the pursuit of truth in everyday life or any other non-educational context, since in any context the pursuit of truth involves virtues such as truthfulness, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency, respect for evidence, etc.

(Hirst and White Vol 1: 231)





As Elliott points out, this is a very different kind of justification from that found earlier in Peters’ works. It makes a practically wise life the main function of education, bypassing the earlier emphasis on pursuing science, philosophy etc for their own intrinsic features. 






In another of his essays, ‘Richard Peters: a philosopher in the older style’, Ray Elliott says that although in The Logic of Education Hirst and Peters ‘emphasise that the forms [of knowledge] are historical institutions, which have undergone a long period of evolution’, it is surprising that Peters elsewhere gives such an a priori account of them. Elliott writes

‘The aims and procedures of historical institutions…will tend to be extremely complex, and to be discoverable only by resolute and sensitive empirical enquiry…..[Peters] does not anywhere acknowledge that the disciplines stand in need of thoroughgoing interdisciplinary investigation and critique. His attitude seems to be that they are self-correcting and should be trusted absolutely.’ (Hirst and White Vol 1: 97-8).

In this connexion, look again at the quotation from Peters with which I began:

‘Science, mathematics, history, art, cooking and carpentry feature on the curriculum, not bingo, bridge and billiards. Presumably there must be some reason for this apart from their utilitarian or vocational value.’ (Ethics and Education p144). 

The kind of ‘reason’ that Peters has in mind is one to do with justification. But if we want to know why science, mathematics etc feature on the curriculum, a much more obvious way of understanding this is as a request for a historical explanation. There is no reason to presume that this will lead us to non-utilitarian motives for their inclusion, but, equally, there is no reason at this point to rule these out.

In what follows, I want to sketch something of the historical story that lies behind the traditional school curriculum. This will not only draw attention to its local and contingent character; it will also provide answers, historically located and not timeless answers, to puzzling questions that we have already been grappling with in Section 1. Why is comprehensive knowledge – getting inside not just one or two, but all the forms of knowledge – educationally important? And, building on this, why is it important to be intrinsically motivated to have this comprehensive knowledge?

If we look into the historical story, there are very clear answers to these questions. How far they are answers which Richard Peters would himself accept is a further question. I will come back to this in Section 6. 

In saying that ‘Science, mathematics, history, art, cooking and carpentry feature on the curriculum’, Peters was talking about a particular kind of curriculum. In a British context, this was, broadly speaking, the curriculum for so-called ‘middle-class schools’ proposed by the Taunton Commission of the 1860s and made compulsory for the new state secondary grammar schools introduced in 1904.

The great rival of this ‘modern’ curriculum in the nineteenth century had been the classics-based curriculum. This was seen as appropriate for the top public schools by the Clarendon Commission, also in the 1860s. The third great commission of that class-conscious decade, the Newcastle, proposed a curriculum based on the 3 Rs for the working classes.

By the 1960s, when Peters was writing, the victory of the ‘modern’ curriculum over its rivals was well on the way. It was sealed by the arrival of the National Curriculum in 1988, which imposed it not only on every state secondary school but on every state primary as well. The ten compulsory subjects of 1988 were almost identical to those in the 1904 Secondary Regulations.

How did this ‘modern’ curriculum grow up in the first place? Why, by the 1860s, had it been officially identified with middle-class schooling? There are two preliminary points to note. 

[1] The core of this curriculum had always been knowledge in its different forms. Physical education and more purely aesthetic pursuits had been added to this in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, English literature having been part of the knowledge-based core since the eighteenth century, when it had been mined for its contributions to truths about human nature and society. [Note 1] 

[2] The curriculum had always been based on a notion of general education. Although all kinds of institutions, from 1600 onwards, have taught individual subjects, from Italian to fencing, the modern curriculum that came down to us via Taunton was a compulsory course in a range of types of knowledge. 

This curriculum can be traced back before the 1860s. You find it in the general course required for the University of London, later UCL, when it was founded in 1826. After 1838, you find it in the London Matriculation exam required for entrance to the London course, but soon used by secondary schools for other purposes. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, you find it in the English Dissenting Academies, set up after 1662 to provide a higher education for dissenting families excluded from Oxford and Cambridge. Over the same period, you find it in the Scottish universities, closely connected as they were with the Dissenting Academies, and also a model for the new University of London. Between 1660 and 1860, you find it in numerous examples of secondary schools set up by Quakers, Methodists, Unitarians and other dissenters. Examples of curricula from these various institutions are in Note 2. 

It is no accident that most of these institutions had connexions with the Dissenters in England and the Presbyterians in Scotland. The Dissenters, often with backgrounds in industry and commerce, formed a large part of the ‘middling classes’ who rose to political power in the nineteenth century and for whom Taunton’s ‘middle-class schools’ were intended. Looking backwards from the eighteenth century, Dissenters and Scottish Presbyterians were descendants of radical protestant reformers, mainly Calvinists, of the sixteenth century, and, in the case of English dissenters, descendants of the Puritan groups who seized power in the mid-seventeenth. 







Pierre de la Ramée  (Ramus) (1515-1573) was the grandson of a poor charcoal burner from northern France who rose to become Regius Professor of Eloquence and Philosophy at the University of Paris in 1551. His Dialecticae Libri Duo of 1556 was massively influential on the intellectual life of Europe, although the reasons for this have been misunderstood. A received view has been that Ramus’ primary achievement was to have replaced Aristotle’s logic with a logic of his own and that this led to a lengthy dispute between supporters of the two logical systems in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, in which Ramism fared worse. 

An alternative perception is that Ramus’ main goal was pedagogical. Educated Europeans of his day had been brought up at their grammar schools and universities in a tradition of Aristotelian scholarship based on the reading of texts in the original Greek and on commentaries on them. It was not easy for many young scholars to make headway through the complexities and obscurities, and even harder for those of them who could not afford the many years of higher education needed to cope with them. Ramus himself had been taught in this way and bitterly attacked its emphasis on disputatiousness rather than the pursuit of truth. (Graves 1912: 21-25). On this reading, Ramus’ foremost achievement was to have provided students, not least less privileged but ambitious students, with a swift, manageable, efficient way of mastering and remembering what they needed to know in a whole range of subjects and classical authors, including Aristotle.

In particular, Ramus wanted the disciplines of the trivium and quadrivium traditionally studied at university (in theory if not all in practice) to be made more accessible to the learner. The key to this was his famous idea of the one, single ‘method’. This was based on three principles. Items of subject matter had to be all true (unlike the dubious material in many existing textbooks); they were to be grouped together in their proper categories (so that, for instance, material on geometry would not be included in a work on arithmetic); the order of presentation was to be from general to particular (thus in a clear, logical, and easily assimilable way). (Graves 1912: ch 5)

In subject after subject, Ramus was able to produce a logical breakdown of the main topics, This was represented visually on a single page in the form of a branching diagram, most typically involving dichotomies. This gave students a clear route-map through what they then had to learn in more detail.

In terms of curriculum coverage, Ramus applied his method to the basic teaching of a wider range of subjects than was usual at the time – including arithmetic, geometry, optics, physics and music as well as grammar, dialectic and rhetoric. In 1551 he described a seven year curriculum he had introduced to teach these subjects to boys aged between 8 and 15 at the College de Presles in Paris.(Grafton and Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities p ***, following Sharratt 1976)

Ramus initiated a pedagogical tradition. Its heartland was north-west Germany, where this speedier and more effective way of learning was taken up especially in many high schools (gymnasia) and academies. The most important of these was Herborn Academy. This was the intellectual home of the three leading scholars who carried on Ramus’s work: Keckermann, Alsted, and Comenius.

Bartholomaus Keckermann (***) rejected many of the specifics of Ramus’ teachings, but developed his general curricular approach. Academic subjects themselves could also be ordered within a branching diagram, with general principles governing their separation from each other at one end and room for new sub-branches of learning to be added at the other. Implicit in Ramus’ method was the vision of an encyclopaedic arrangement of all the varieties of knowledge. 

Keckermann had plans, partly realised, to expand beyond the six or seven subjects in Ramus’ curriculum to include all the disciplines found in Aristotle’s philosophy, arranged under the headings of theoretical (contemplative) and practical (operative) disciplines (HH 151-2). [Note 3]. His project was vigorously pursued by his successor at Herborn, Johann Heinrich Alsted (   ). This culminated in the comprehensive account of all branches of theoretical and practical knowledge, as well as of the mechanical arts, found in his Encyclopaedia of ***.  

The Ramist tradition was developed beyond Alsted by the latter’s student, Comenius (   ). He shared its interest both in ordering knowledge on an encyclopaedic scale – in his own case via his notion of ‘pansophism’ – and in efficient ways of transmitting this knowledge, in his case not only to older students but also to young children. His illustrated Orbis Pictus is an encyclopaedia in miniature, built around labelled pictures of objects and craft activities in the world around them. His Great Didactic, in line with its subtitle, sets forth ‘the whole art of teaching all things to all men’ so that schools can be founded in every locality in which all young people ‘shall quickly, pleasantly and thoroughly become learned in the sciences, pure in morals, trained to piety...’ The book contains all the hallmarks of the developing Ramist tradition. It advocates giving children a general outline of a subject before branching out further towards specifics; comprehensive coverage of the curriculum; adherence to a single method, elimination of unnecessary content; clear and detailed guidance by the teacher; efficient organisation so that no time is wasted; careful attention to suitable introductory textbooks; practical application to everyday life of all the knowledge acquired. 





I have not yet mentioned one of the most important aspects of this tradition. By 1600 the pedagogical revolution that Ramus initiated became closely associated with Calvinism. Although there was by no means a complete overlap, the emphasis in Calvinism on an ordered system of beliefs, paring away excrescences, simplicity and directness, efficiency and time-saving, reduced reliance on authority, diligence in study, and useful application of knowledge makes its take-up unsurprising. There was a close association between the two movements across Northern Europe from Ireland, through Scotland (whose Alexander Melville, the creator of the modern curriculum in Scottish universities had sat at Ramus’ feet as a student), England, Holland, to Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Bohemia, and beyond. Puritan emigration to New England meant that Ramist ideas long remained dominant in Harvard College, (founded ***). 

Given the close connexion, how far do religious reasons help to explain attachment to the Ramist tradition? Howard Hotson puts most weight on secular motivation. He emphasises its attractiveness, in the years before and after 1600, to gymnasia and academies in north-west Germany catering to the needs both of a mercantile élite and of local principalities looking for a reliable civil service. An education that was useful, efficient and relatively inexpensive met these demands perfectly.

But there were also religious reasons. The secular hypothesis does not explain the interest in encyclopaedic knowledge – rather than those kinds of knowledge especially applicable to worldly affairs. 

Around 1600, a widely held view in Calvinist circles had to do with the Fall. Man had been created in the image of God. The Fall meant that there had to be a new ‘instauration’ in man of this image. Not all had been lost. The human mind still contained ‘slender rays of its pristine light’, as manifested in its intellectual and volitional abilities (HH: IIG p1). The school was the institution in which these abilities could be developed, and therewith the image of God in man restored. Keckermann, Alsted and Comenius all thought this way. It was closely connected with their encyclopaedism. In Alsted’s words 

Although God alone is wise and all-knowing, nevertheless he impresses the image of his perfection on men who desire to learn, as is seen especially in those who by vehement force of mind embrace the whole orb of the disciplines,’ that is to say, ’what is commonly called the encyclopaedia.’ (HH p11). 

Comenius’ pansophism and the encyclopaedic education he devised to realise it have the same rationale. Near the beginning of his Great Didactic, he states that 

it is evident that man is naturally capable of a knowledge of all things, since, in the first place, he is the image of God. For an image, if it be accurate, necessarily reproduces the outlines of its archetype, as otherwise it will not be an image. Now omniscience is chief among the properties of God, and it follows that the image of this must be reflected in man. (p41)







Religious and secular motivations should not, in any case be kept in mutually discrete compartments. Calvinism was devoted to diligent social and economic improvement as a sign of devotion to God. The two kinds of reason for a modern, general education run through its later history in Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. 

We find both of them in the extraordinary story of the ‘Three Foreigners’ who ran educational policy for the Puritans between 1640 and 1660. These were Samuel Hartlib, John Dury, and Comenius himself – all of them educated by pupils or admirers of Keckermann (HH 1994. 45). Comenius, invited to England by Parliament in 1641-2, projected a millenarian reform of English education for the approaching ‘last age of the world....in which Christ and his Church shall triumph… an age of Enlightenment, in which the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of God, as the waters cover the sea’ (TR: 271). To this end, he recommended a national system of education stretching from a central ‘Pansophical’ college down to elementary schools. After his departure and until the Restoration in 1660, Hartlib, Dury and their associates kept up the work of pamphleteering and practical reform, writing pansophical works on universal education, inspiring Milton to write his treatise On Education, planning agricultural colleges, academies and both élite and common schools, drafting proposals for a federal university of London, helping to set up Durham University in 1657 (CW 112-4,.207-217, 222-3, 236). At every level, the curricular orientation was towards comprehensiveness and towards modern subjects, not least science, and not least for their practical applications. 

After 1660, Anglicanism triumphed. Puritans and other radical protestants like the Quakers who refused to conform (the ‘Dissenters’) were excluded from public life. But the schools and academies that they now set up, often illegally, kept alive the ‘modern’ curriculum. As earlier, religious reasons went along with secular ones. 

Philip Doddridge (1728: 48), the founder of Northampton Academy, writing of students like himself at Kibworth Academy around ••••, states that ‘they are taught in all the several Branches of their Course to acknowledge God and direct their Enquiries and their Labours to his Glory’. Personal preference for one area of the curriculum over another was, on this way of thinking, far less important than gaining a comprehensive grasp of the whole circle of knowledge. This comes out in an account that Thomas Secker, later Archbishop of Canterbury, gives in 1711 of the education he is receiving at Tewkesbury Academy:

As for my own part, I apply myself with what diligence I can to every thing that is the subject of our lectures, without preferring one subject before another; because I see nothing we are engaged in, but what is either necessary, or extremely useful for one who would thoroughly understand those things which most concern him, or be able to explain them well to others.’ (••• : 418). 

That religious reasons for an encyclopaedic curriculum were still salient much later in the history of the Academies is evident from the words of Thomas Barnes, principal of Manchester Academy, at its opening in 1786.

Of all subjects, DIVINITY seems most to demand the aid of kindred, and even of apparently remoter sciences. Its objects are GOD and MAN: and nothing, which can either illustrate the perfections of the one, or the nature, capacities, and history of the other, can be entirely eliminated.

But how extensive a field do these subjects open? Natural Philosophy, in its widest sense, comprehending whatever relates to the history or properties of the works of Nature, in the Earth, the Air, the Ocean, and including Natural History, Chemistry, &c. has an immediate reference to the one – and to the other belong, all that Anatomy and Physiology can discover relating to the body, and all that Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, History, or Revelation declare concerning the mind. But here again the field still opens upon us. For History, as well as Revelation, demands the knowledge of Languages; and these again, of Customs and Arts, the stream of science still branching out into more and wider channels. (Sell 2004: 11-12)

Remarks like these throw light on the Unitarian Gilbert Wakefield’s  (1756-1801) reported denunciation of the academies for their attempts to make students digest ‘the whole Encyclopaedia in three years’ (McLachlan??? 1931: 33). Wakefield, a classics tutor at both Warrington and Hackney academies, also said that ‘the grand error in almost every dissenting academy has been the attempt to teach and learn too much.’  (p.40).









Note 1. A graphic indication of the persisting higher status of knowledge-based subjects down to our own time lies in the order in which National Curriculum subjects have been presented in official documents. The 1999 Handbook for secondary teachers, for instance, lists these as: English, mathematics, science, design and technology, ICT, history, geography, modern foreign languages, art and design, music, physical education. (Since 2007, subjects have been listed alphabetically, with art and design coming first).

Note 2. Here are some examples of modern curricula in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Note how school curricula were influenced by those found in higher education (academies and universities).  

Northampton Dissenting Academy in the 1720s. The full list of subjects for the four-year course was: Year 1: logic, rhetoric, geography, metaphysics, geometry, algebra; Year 2: trigonometry, conic sections, celestial mechanics, natural and experimental philosophy, divinity, orations; Year 3: natural and civil history, anatomy, Jewish antiquities, divinity, orations; Year 4: civil law, mythology and hieroglyphics, English history, history of nonconformity, divinity, preaching and pastoral care

Wesley’s Kingswood School of 1749 (Wesley 1749:245). The  curriculum included Reading, Writing, Arithmetic, English, French, Latin, Greek, Hebrew; History, Geography, Chronology; Rhetoric, Logic, Ethics, Geometry, Algebra, Physics, Music (op.cit.:2). Wesley based it partly on Northampton Academy.

Scottish Universities MA in Arts course, eighteenth century. Greek tended to be taught in the first year; logic and metaphysics in the second; ethics and pneumatics (the study of spirits, human and divine; ancestor of psychology and philosophy of mind) in the third; and natural philosophy (ie physics), probably including some mathematics, in the fourth (Knox 1953: 16-17).

University of London 1826. Its four-year general course covered Latin, Greek and mathematics in the first and second years, logic and philosophy of mind, chemistry and natural philosophy in year three, and jurisprudence, political economy, natural philosophy, moral and political philosophy in year four (Bellot 1929: 79).

Grove House School, in Tottenham, was a Quaker foundation of 1828. Its planned curriculum consisted of Latin and Greek, the principles of religious liberty and the British constitution, geography and history in relation to the Bible, advanced and applied mathematics, natural philosophy.





When he was appointed conrector of the Danzig gymnasium (high school) in 1602, Keckermann worked out and began to teach a succinct three year encyclopaedic course based on logic and physics in the first year, metaphysics and mathematics (including astronomy and geography as well as arithmetic and geometry) in the second, and practical philosophy (ethics, philosophy and economics) in the third. (HH 154).
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